Afghan Holocaust in Isfahan: Murder, Vandalization and Plunder

Although it contained a fairly large proportion of hastily assembled volunteers who were inadequately trained and armed, there were also experienced fighting troops such as the corps of royal squires (qullar), which included a four-hundred strong guards unit under the command of the experienced Georgian general Rustam Khan; a 12,000 strong corps of Arab cavalry commanded by the vail of 'Arabistan, who is said to have been called Sayyid 'Abd-Allah; two Lorian contingents of mounted tribal warriors, one under the command of 'All Mardan Khan Faill, the other under 'All Riza Khan from Kuhglluya; and a detachment of artillery with twenty-four guns commanded by a Persian with the assistance of an experienced French master-gunner.

When battle commenced the following afternoon, the Persians gained initial successes that very nearly reduced Mahmud to a state of panic. It soon became apparent, however, that there was a total lack of coordination on the Persian side. There was no unified supreme command, responsibility being shared by two men who were, what is more, sworn enemies. They were the new Grand Vizier (i'timad al-daula) Muhammad Qull Khan Shamlu and the vail of 'Arabistan. The latter owed his position to the special favour of the shah whilst the Grand Vizier, as a former general of the guards (qurchi-bashl), was expected to possess military ability - a totally unwarranted assumption.

The Persians' main asset, their heavy artillery, was scarcely of any account because the Afghans succeeded in eliminating it early in the battle. Whereas the absence of a clear hierarchy of command proved fatal to the Persians, the superior coordination of their own forces enabled the Afghans to make the best of a bad job even in awkward situations. By the end of the day the Persian forces had collapsed and were retreating in undisciplined fashion into Isfahan. Their- losses are estimated at 5,000 men, whereas the Afghans are said to have lost only a tenth of that number. Only fear of an ambush prevented the Afghans from pursuing the defeated Persians into the city.

It seems that Mahmud did not immediately realise the full extent of the Persian defeat and the demoralisation it entailed. The fact that he had neglected to take the citadels of both Kirman and Yazd during the course of his advance may well suggest that a military engagement with the shah was his major aim, but it does not necessarily imply that he had in mind the destruction of Safavid rule from the very outset of his campaign. At any rate, the victory does not appear to have deprived him of the capacity for making a realistic assessment of the possibilities open to him. It is difficult otherwise to explain why he let three days go by before resuming his march on Isfahan, now only nineteen miles away. On reaching the area south of the Zayandarud, he came upon Sultan Husain's favourite castle of Farahabad. In spite of the existence of defence works, he was able to take it without a fight and set up his headquarters there.

The Armenian suburb Julfa was then plundered and a tribute ruthlessly exacted from the inhabitants, to whom — rather than to Persian soldiers — it owed its defence. These actions suggest that the Afghan troops were still very much aware of the fact that they might suddenly have to retreat. Mahmud no doubt saw clearly that the victory of Gulnabad had been won to a large extent thanks to a combination of favourable circumstances; nor is he likely to have forgotten that at one moment during the battle he had been close to accepting defeat and retreating. Finally, he must have realised that in spite of the defeat the shah's military resources were as yet by no means exhausted.

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