The Arab states called for the return of the Negev, Galilee and the Latrun salient, as well as the internationalisation of Jerusalem and Jaffa: the total effect would have been to reduce Israel to a third of the area allocated to her under the original UN partition plan. Israel wanted to retain the frontiers established in the armistice agreements, and was firmly opposed to any idea of internationalising Jerusalem. She demanded that the whole question should be discussed again in the forthcoming session of the Assembly (at this time a body still relatively favourable towards Israel).
The differences revealed by these answers, both on frontiers and on the refugees, was so great that the Conciliation Commission decided to abandon the Lausanne meetings and issued a warning that, unless the parties showed themselves more conciliatory, it could not organise successful negotiations, as the Assembly had asked. The 1949 Assembly none the less asked the Commission to continue its work. It also discussed yet another plan for the internationalisation of Jerusalem which the Commission had produced. The city would be demilitarised and neutralised. There would be a Jewish zone and an Arab zone with their own local authorities, but with a general council drawn from representatives of the two zones. The plan was, however, rejected by both Israel and Jordan, which declared that they would refuse to implement it (though both agreed to secure the protection of the holy places).
The idea of internationalising Jerusalem continued to be discussed for the next two or three assemblies. The 1949 Assembly reaffirmed the aim of internationalising Jerusalem and the surrounding area, and designated the Trusteeship Council as the administering authority. It requested the Trusteeship Council, as it had a year and a half previously, to undertake the preparation of a 'statute' for Jerusalem. The Trusteeship Council proceeded once more to prepare such a statute; but this remained as much of a dead letter as all previous plans proposed for that troubled city. The only visible outcome was that the Commission appointed a UN representative in Jerusalem, who acted for many years as a source of information and advice for the UN on developments in the area.
The Conciliation Commission then tried once more to bring about negotiations for a final settlement. But it had no more success than before. Many of the differences continued to be about procedure. Israel still insisted on direct negotiations with each Arab state separately, while the Arab states were determined to negotiate as a bloc, with the Commission acting as mediator. The Arabs wanted negotiations about the refugee question to be completed before going on to discuss other points, while Israel wanted it considered as one aspect of the general peace settlement. Eventually, on 29 March 1950, the Commission proposed as a compromise the establishment of JOInt committees meeting under the chairmanship of a representative of the Commission. Each meeting would be attended by those countries concerned with the subject under discussion.
The Arab League accepted these proposals (which were somewhat nearer to the Arab point of view), but its secretary-general subsequently said that this was conditional on Israel accepting earlier UN decisions on partition and the internationalisation of Jerusalem. Israel, on the other hand, at first rejected the Commission's proposals, but subsequently changed her mind. On 15 May the Commission interpreted these conflicting answers as opening the way to a conference on the lines it had suggested. On 13 June, however, the Egyptian Government withdrew its delegate to the Commission; and soon afterwards Egypt, Syria and Lebanon all rejected the proposals for joint committees, declaring that they would no longer negotiate with Israel under the auspices of the Commission.