He had gambled and chosen Pirnia, a democratically-oriented and principled politician, as Prime Minister despite his superior’s displeasure, with every hope that his candidate would prove successful and accomplish what Norman’s predecessor, Cox, had failed to do with an unpopular and authoritarian Vosouq. Norman had hoped that Pirnia would hold new parliamentary elections and his honesty and good name would ensure the passage of the Agreement, albeit with some modifications and ornamental changes. Norman had resisted Curzon’s attem pts to install another authoritarian politician as prime minister because he knew that imprisonment and exile of opponents was not the way to have the Agreement ratified.
Pirnia gave a good account of himself, served his country well and remained true to his principles. It is interesting to note that even in early 1920 «dien an Iranian was prepared to stand up to the British he could have his way up to a point, a lesson seldom, if ever, learned by Pimia’s contemporaries. He refused to have anything to do with the Agreement without parliamentary approval. He took no action which would allow even a part of the Agreement to be deemed to have come into operation. The military clause to reorganise the army, intended to assert total British military control and the financial clause, designed basically to isolate Iran economically, had been placed in abeyance. He refused to touch the £2 million loan lest it be interpreted that Iran had benefitted under the term s of the Agreement. However, by having pushed Pimia a step too far Norman had lost his chosen premier and any hope of returning to a constitutional government. In fairness to Norman, it m ust be said that Pirnia might have worked out well. Certainly he had a better chance than his predecessor at least partially to implement Curzon’s policy, that is to tie Iran to Britain irrevocably, with or without an agreement. No-one had foreseen the extent of Bolshevik penetration in the northern provinces nor their material support of the insuigents. Furthermore no-one, including Curzon, had counted on the British Cabinet bowing to public pressure to withdraw all her troops from northern Iran.
What made little sense was th at Norman’s new candidate, Sepahdar, was probably the weakest and most servile Prime Minister since the beginning of the constitutional era. He had been subservient to British and Russian interests in Iran from the outset of his public career and had followed their dictates without question. As a man of great wealth and the largest landowner in Gilan he had a great deal to lose if British influence diminished or the Bolsheviks became ascendant. He had already suffered losses in the turmoil caused by the insurgency in Gilan.
Despite his European-style attire Sepahdar spoke not a word of a foreign language and his Persian is said to have been wanting. Accounts abound of his slowness of mind and lack of education. Though he was slow and timid, his asset in British eyes was his being a devout and tested member of the anglophile clique who had already been awarded the KCMG in 1903 by the British Crown. In 1907, having taken a marginal part in the constitutional movement, he had been arrested by Mohammad Ali Shah. At the intervention of the British Legation he had been released from jail and exiled to Mazandaran. He returned to Tehran in December 1908 and, fearing arrest again, took refuge at the Russian Legation until July 1909. In early 1910 he went to Europe and returned later the same year. He had served as Minister of War during Vosouq’s second term as Prime Minister. He had not been entirety loyal to Vosouq and had undermined him by organising protests in the Bazaar. When found out, he had been forced to resign. Sepahdar’s motives for intriguing against Vosouq are uncertain. They probably had to do with his having been left out of Vosouq’s inner circle and his long-harboured ambition to become Prime Minister.
What had now become important to Norman was the fact that Sepahdar *would do as he was told’. Equally important was the fact that Sepahdar had laid down no conditions in accepting office other than continued financial assistance and a promise by Britain to strengthen the fighting capabilities of the Cossacks. Sepahdar found no difficulty in having British officers in command of the Cossacks. The bogeyman Starosselsky, who had proved a primary obstacle to Britain's implementing the military clause of the Agreement, had been removed. Britain could now move ahead. Sepahdar had promised to convene parliament and to get the Agreement through once he had a quorum. The cabinet he was to form would not include anyone objectionable to the Foreign Office. Surely Norman believed that Curzon would be pleased with the change and the new Prime Minister.
Ironside appears intemperate in having described Norman as ‘indeterminate*. The harassed Norman may have appeared so to Ironside, who had never dealt with Curzon. He did not know of Norman's daily struggle with Curzon nor that Norman had staked his reputation and career in standing up to the m aster of British diplomacy and his impossible and ‘insane policy’. What probably induced Norman to agree with Ironside in the removal of Starosselsky was Norman’s having come around to believing that the Cossack Division under British command could hold off the insurgents a while longer. Additionally, in any possible battle with Bolshevik forces British troops would be more likely to aid the Cossacks with arm s and logistical assistance instead of standing aloof as they had while the Division was under Russian command. There would be at least some breathing space and things could take a turn for the better in Tehran. Norman had every reason to think that Curzon would be pacified by the removal of Starosselsky, the tacit implementation of the military clause of the Agreement and the resignation of Pimia, who had seemed anathem a to him.
In a euphoric telegram on 28 October Norman informed Curzon that Sepahdar had agreed to form a government. He is ‘totally in our hands’ and has promised to call parliament into session and have a vote on the ratification of the Agreement. Norman, as in previous instances, warned that no-one would accept office with the knowledge that there were no funds in the treasury. He argued that the monthly subsidy of 350,000 tomans should be extended for at least a month or two. The last of these payments had been made on 24 October 1920. The Imperial Bank had been ready to advance funds by way of commercial loans but Curzon had objected. The bank had argued that the Iranian Government had to stay afloat if it were to continue doing business in the countiy. If the Bolsheviks took over, it would be forced to close all branches in northern Iran. The Bank persisted in its argument and finally succeeded in being allowed to advance credit, but the monthly subsidy remained blocked.
The Earlier Presence of Armenians in Iran
