The Shi‘a clergy developed a religious hierarchy, analogous to that of other religions – to that of the Catholic church, for example – but quite unlike the looser arrangements of Sunni Islam. As time went on, and more ambitious young men strove to qualify as mojtahed, new, more elevated levels of dignity were added to distinguish between the clerics – hojjatoleslam (‘proof of Islam’), and ayatollah (‘sign of God’). This system helped the ulema to reassert their social authority and to restore their status, as a class; this time quite independently of secular rulers, at a time (the nineteenth century) when the monarchy continued to be relatively weak.
Religious law has a much wider signifi cance in Islam than in Christianity and other religions. In principle, it is meant to govern every aspect of a Muslim’s life. This gave clerics a role much more important than that of mere prayer- leaders in the mosque. They were arbitrators in family or business or other legal disputes and acted as judges in criminal cases. They served as notaries for offi cial documents. Often they were the only authority fi gures in smaller towns or villages and acted effectively as governors, in association with elders or village headmen. In the larger towns and cities the ulema tended to have specially close connections with the merchants and craftsmen of the bazaars, who often demonstrated their piety by giving money for religious purposes – for example to repair the roof of a mosque or to help set up a religious school (madreseh). Bazaari and ulema families often intermarried. Between them, the ulema and the bazaaris tended to be the dominant urban classes, and their close relationship came to be of central im - portance in politics from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. Through the religious hierarchy, the contacts established during their long training, and family connections, the ulema had access to a network of clergy and ordinary Muslims across the whole country, and beyond.
The strong position of the ulema in Iranian society meant that when secular authority failed or was challenged, almost always the ulema (or at least some of them) emerged as leaders of political dissent. This happened in 1890 – 92 (when the government attempted to grant a tobacco monopoly to a British contractor, Major Talbot, but had to reverse the policy in the face of a determined boycott organized by clerics and bazaaris), in 1905 – 6, in 1953 , in 1963and, of course, in 1978 – 9 . They were able to communicate and coordinate action with other ulema, and to disseminate propaganda, often using the most up- to- date communications technology (in 1892 , the telegraph system; in 1978 , cassette- tapes, telephone and Xerox copiers). Their religious authority gave them a unique advantage by comparison with other potential leaders of mass movements; it meant independence and a degree of immunity from repression, as a class. Secular rulers found it diffi cult, and often counterproductive, to act even against individual mullahs. And in addition, the most senior marjas were often out of reach of the Iranian government altogether, living in Najaf or one of the other shrine cities of Ottoman Iraq (the three provinces of Ottoman Iraq – Mosul, Baghdad and Basra – were ruled under a British mandate from 1920 and became the independent Kingdom of Iraq in 1932 ).
Shia Inspiration of Iranian Constitutionalism: Eternal Justice and Its Incarnation
