The nationalists’ att empts to consolidate the constitutional government were crippled by political divisiveness among the victorious parties, a devastated economy, inadequate government revenues, and the lack of a strong military to back government authority. The Qajar regular army was of litt le value, and most of the tribal levies quickly returned home. The Cossack Brigade, still the most eff ective military formation in Iran, was an uncertain ally at best because of continued Russian infl uence. When the revolutionary armies took control of the capital, Colonel Liakhov negotiated the brigade’s surrender, accepted service under the new government, and agreed to act under the orders of the minister of war. Because of the threat of rioting and looting, the Cossacks’ weapons were returned, and the brigade quickly restored order in Tehran. All the Cossack offi cers were made to pledge allegiance to the constitution, but the Russians showed litt le respect for the new authorities. Aft er Liakhov was replaced in November, the Russians began to reassert themselves. The Russian and British legations, meanwhile, worked to limit the consideration of any military reforms by the new government. They also prevented the removal of Russian officers from the Cossack Brigade, the adoption of an Iranian name for the unit, and the hiring of other European military advisers who might reduce Russian and British influence.
The mujahedin and Bakhtiari soldiers who captured Tehran gradually became a problem. The northern mujahedin remaining in Tehran wanted the government to address various grievances while the tribal forces grabbed power and infl uence. Many of the poorly paid rank- and- fi le fighters sought to squeeze greater rewards for their service from the new government while others turned to crime to survive. The nationalists proposed to disband these militias but had no means to enforce the action because the Cossack Brigade, despite the Russian legation’s desire to see the mujahedin disarmed, refused to help. Government pension off ers were met with violent protests over the payment’s size, and, in one incident, Satt ar Khan, the hero of Tabriz, was wounded and disabled trying to calm his veterans. Outside of Tehran, resentment of the Bakhtiaris’ growing power sparked a revolt in 1910 by their Qashqai tribal rivals in Fars Province. The threat to trade from the revolt and the prospect of a British military intervention forced the Majles to agree to create a new organization to guard the roads in southern Iran, diverting men and resources from other pressing needs. In an attempt to advance critical fi nancial reforms, the constitutional government hired an American, W. Morgan Shuster, to be the treasurer general with the mission to reorganize Iran’s disordered and highly corrupt tax system and to improve its fi nancial situation.
Shuster arrived in Iran in early 1911 to find its Treasury Department in crisis because of wasteful military spending. The American discovered that there was no budget or budgeting process and, in general, no accountability. The War Department took an estimated half of nominal Qajar revenues for the arsenals, general staff, medical corps, and combat forces. Shuster commented that the army was virtually mythical because he never encountered an appreciable number of regular army personnel except when the Treasury was approached for pay. He described the War Department as “the roosting- place for the most brilliant galaxy of uniformed loafers, masquerading as generals, commissaries, and chiefs of staff , of petty grafters, amiable cutt hroats and all- round scoundrels which it has ever been my fortune to encounter.” Shuster batt led constantly with the unrealistic demands made by Vali Khan for funds that he refused to account for. Similarly, he found that the Bakhtiari khans and others providing tribal forces to the government tried to extort exorbitant sums in return for their services. Shuster reported that even the foreign legations in Tehran tried to soak up government revenues by keeping large numbers of their citizens on Iran’s salary and pension rolls. The Europeans on these lists rarely ranked less than colonel, and Shuster noted that one elderly and usually incapacitated Italian offi cer had managed to remain on the War Department registry with the self- awarded rank of general. Shuster’s steadfast eff orts to trim the rolls of deadwood contributed to Iranian and European opposition to his role and, eventually, to the Iranian leadership’s willingness to submit to Russian ultimatums for his removal.
Russian Occupation of Northwester Persian and Rebellions
