Consequently, a unit of about 100 men trained in antiguerrilla warfare that had been receiving U.S. equipment would reinforce the army contingent in the guerrilla area, almost doubling it. Meanwhile, MILGP representatives, as Fisher had said, would accompany it into the area and once there see for themselves what was going on. We shall return to the issue of the observers but first should note that the Bolivian armed forces chief of staff added one more request, this one very mundane. He wanted field rations for the new unit while it operated in the area. Many Bolivian contingents still relied upon field kitchens, providing a low level of nutrition for the soldiers and limiting their mobility in antiguerrilla operations, a unit being able to patrol only as far as it could go and still get back for lunch or dinner. All parties in Bolivia, including Barrientos, approved of these plans.
Washington, however, did not. The ambassador had to fight bitterly to get the field rations, threatening to resign, and eventually going to the chief of Southern Command, General Robert W. Porter, Jr., to back his request. The Pentagon did not see itself as a caterer, and field rations were not among the items it sent under military-assistance programs. It saw no reason to change for the sake of Bolivia. Although, under steady pressure, it gave in by the end of the month, the Pentagon's irritation radiates even through official telegraphic language when finally and grudgingly it informed the embassy through the State Department that, considering the urgency of the situation, it agreed to the request; the rations were on their way from Southern Command.
The suggestion that U.S. personnel would accompany Bolivian troops into the combat area, however, became a much more serious issue. The embassy and especially the MILGP felt sure that the Bolivians were deliberately exaggerating the danger to justify requests for preposterous kinds and amounts of weapons. But how could they be sure? The obvious answer was to have a look themselves, sending trained soldiers from the advisory group. The head of the group, U.S. Air Force colonel Lawrence E. Horras, states that he was the one who proposed sending the two observers, soldiers who had once been Green Berets. Henderson agreed, reluctantly some say. Consequently, the idea surfaced again in a communication to Washington. A paragraph in a cable discussing the overall situation consisted of one innocuous-sounding sentence: "Milgrp [sic] will perform standard MAP inspection in reported guerrilla area beginning March 27"—that is, six days later. According to Henderson, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Robert M. Sayre sent the message to Secretary Dean Rusk. It caused a tornado. Meanwhile, on March 24, the day after the first ambush of Bolivian soldiers, the U.S. officers arrived in Camiri, the site of an army divisional headquarters near the disputed area.
Soon after the message went to Rusk, the State Department's Bolivian desk officer placed a breathless call to La Paz. "Don't ask any questions," Henderson remembers him saying; "if you haven't sent them, don't; if you have, get them back." Next, Horras received a stern letter of reprimand from General Porter. Horras's personnel thereafter were confined almost totally to La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, able to go to Camiri for only limited periods and with special permission; they were not allowed to go anywhere in the "guerrilla area." The new rules particularly galled Horras, especially as he felt that his staff could have trained the Bolivians to handle the insurgency without importing a team of Green Berets, as the U.S. government eventually did. From the time of the reprimand, however, he and his group had little to do with checking the guerrillas, permitted mainly to watch while the Green Berets stole the show. A few months later, Horras—a highly decorated flying officer who started his service during World War II, had received several wounds, and survived almost miraculously—was removed from his post and retired the following year.
Worried about Americans being hurt, killed, or kidnapped and thereby deepening U.S. involvement, the State Department quickly sent Henderson clear orders to keep all U.S. personnel, even members of the Peace Corps but particularly of the armed forces, out of the possible zone of combat. "They did not want another Vietnam-type operation," Henderson said later. In fact, the department shot off a flurry of stern telegrams to La Paz while the initial howl from Washington about the observers was still echoing in the embassy. The cables called forth nervous explanations. For example, Henderson pointed out that he authorized the two officers to spend a few days in the zone simply on a standard inspection; furthermore, they were coming out at once and would not be replaced. Two days later, Washington again snapped at the embassy for even suggesting that U.S. personnel undertake certain rearechelon activities as well as occasional daytime reviews of patrol posts. "U.S. military personnel should not repeat not be in any operational areas," Sayre pronounced unambiguously.
But what area should be banned—where and how many square miles? These became crucial issues, especially as no one knew exactly where the guerrillas operated, how many of them there were, or how widely they were spread out. Responding to the embassy, whose irritation at being managed and scolded by Washington glowed through its polite Foreign Service cablese, Patrick Morris, director of Bolivia/Chile affairs, and his chief, Sayre, patiently, almost patronizingly, provided guidelines. To determine if an area should be in or out of the proscribed zone, ask these questions, they said: Would the individuals involved be in danger? Would the United States be embarrassed if their presence in the area became known? If the operation failed, would the United States be blamed? Would it be possible to distinguish between training advice and operational advice? Finally, the department pointedly reminded the embassy that U.S. personnel had not been assigned within operational areas in other countries where guerrillas were active (meaning only in Latin America presumably, obviously not Southeast Asia).
By the end of the first week in April, the zone had been defined: an area starting south of Santa Cruz and extending to, and including, Camiri. The embassy regretted the inclusion of Camiri, headquarters of Bolivian units trying to cope with the insurgency and a point from which news reporters had begun to cover the story. Nevertheless, U.S. military representatives there, six in all, were "hastily withdrawn." As anticipated, the major frustration in maintaining the "no-go" area stemmed from the dearth of reliable information about the guerrilla band. The two observers, during their brief mission, had sent back valuable reports, among other things convincing the embassy that a guerrilla band indeed existed and that the Bolivians needed help in coping with it. But more information was needed, especially as speculation about the band's size and movements appeared repeatedly in the media, and Bolivian military estimates of guerrilla strength, patently inflated, continued to be reported to the embassy. The embassy kept pushing to find out the truth, requesting permission, for example, for representatives of its MILGP to go just to Camiri, far from any known guerrilla activity, and just for a few days.
Furthermore, intelligence was only part of the problem. The Bolivian units in the area could not use the equipment the Americans had provided, especially communications gear; in addition, according to the press and returned visitors, confusion reigned within the supply and command functions at Camiri. Consequently, the embassy received permission to send U.S. military advisers there, at first only after receiving case by case permission from Washington, but soon the rules were relaxed slightly. Advisers could go at the ambassador's discretion, but only after consulting with the chief of Southern Command.
Tehran urges Washington to change tack, says fixed on removal of illegal sanctions in Vienna talks
