Only three weeks after the Azerbaijan issue, another question was raised at the UN, also concerning the presence of foreign forces, this time Western, on the territory of another state requesting their withdrawal. Though not one of those raised by the Soviet Union in retaliation for the discussion of Azerbaijan (probably because it was French rather than British forces that were mainly concerned), it represented none the less a very close parallel.
After the fall of France in 1940, Lebanon and Syria were for a year controlled by Vichy forces. In 1941 they were invaded by the British and the Free French. The Free French general, Catroux, thereupon proclaimed the future independence of the two states, a promise that was underwritten by the British Government. In 1943, after disturbances and political crises in both countries, the French commander, under pressure from the British, was compelled to transfer power to local governments in both countries. By early 1945 the two governments had secured diplomatic recognition from a number of Allied powers. They declared war on the Axis in February 1945, and were represented at the San Francisco Conference.
Negotiations then began between the two states and the French Government now re-established in Paris. In May 1945, while these were proceeding, fresh French forces were landed in Beirut. At the same time France called for new agreements satisfying French strategic and cultural interests in the area. This demand provoked disturbances in Syria. French guns proceeded to shell Damascus. At this point the British Government asked the French authorities to withdraw their forces to barracks, and British forces intervened to restrain the French. The governments of Lebanon and Syria, regarding Britain as their supporter, then asked Britain not to evacuate her own forces so long as 'other foreign forces' remained.
During the rest of 1945 little progress was made in the negotiations between the two states and France. Meanwhile French forces remained and were regarded by the governments of Lebanon and Syria, even though inactive, as a form of tacit pressure on the negotiations. In December Britain arranged with France a meeting of military experts, which discussed a date for the withdrawal of forces from the region. When this produced no change, the governments of Lebanon and Syria in February the following year brought the question to the newly established Security Council.
The continued presence of foreign forces in their territory against their will, they said, represented a threat to international peace and security. The agreement reached between Britain and France, concluded without their participation or consent, was a breach of their sovereignty which was not justified by any existing danger in the area. The charge fitted neatly into the pattern already established by the Azerbaijan, Greek and Indonesian issues: all concerned the continued presence of foreign forces in another territory many months after the war was over. French representatives held that French forces were in the area only as a temporary measure resulting from the war. France had expressed her willingness to withdraw and was willing now to negotiate on the method of achieving this. The British delegate said Britain sympathised with the demand for withdrawal, but recalled that Britain had been asked not to remove her forces so long as others remained.
Resolutions were put forward by Mexico and Egypt calling for the forces of both Western powers to be withdrawn and demanding negotiations to bring this about. Both resolutions were defeated, as too strong, by a combination of Western powers. The Netherlands and the United States then each proposed resolutions expressing 'confidence' that foreign troops would be withdrawn 'as soon as practicable' and that negotiations for this purpose would be undertaken shortly. Syria and Lebanon proposed amendments to these, to ensure that the resolution spoke of negotiations undertaken independently of other issues': their main aim was to ensure that the offer to withdraw was not used to extract concessions on other questions. The Soviet Union demanded that the resolution should explicitly demand that British and French troops should be withdrawn and that negotiations should be begun 'immediately'. These amendments were both defeated. In retaliation the Soviet Union proceeded to veto the US resolution (the Netherlands proposal had now been withdrawn).
This was the first time the veto had been used in the UN and it foreshadowed the reckless way that weapon was to be used in the following years. No essential interest of the Soviet Union was at stake here. Her only criticism was that the resolution was not strong enough. Yet she condemned the Council to impotence, simply because the wording was not to her taste.
Though the resolution was not carried, however, Britain and France announced that, since it had had majority support, they would consider themselves bound by it. This was scarcely an onerous undertaking, since the resolution only asked for them to negotiate, which both had promised to do in any case. The resolution did, however, marginally alter the environment within which these negotiations took place: as with the Soviet Union over Azerbaijan, both powers were put on notice that the world was watching what they were doing and expecting them to announce a withdrawal.