This, it seemed, was what was likely to happen, with the development of various opposing small states under Turkmen princes, roughly comparable to the petty princedoms of Anatolia in the 8th/14th century. It is not inappropriate to describe the situation by saying that Shah 'Abbas had to reconquer his own land "from the Tiirkmens and other military leaders who had to all intents and purposes become autonomous". By throwing in his newly constituted forces, and by dint of an adroit policy at home, he managed to master this Sisyphean task.
His perspicacity is particularly evident from the fact that in spite of the tough, even brutal measures he took, he did not allow himself to be swept into a rigid consistency of action which might have called forth a solid front on the part of the mutually disaffected tribal chieftains. Thus he not only preserved the old lifeguards but, as we have seen, retained in addition to the new military formations contingents of the old Qizilbash amirs; and he did not touch the possessions of the Turkmen lords provided they remained loyal. Indeed, new fiefs - were granted, and not only to Turkmen army officers but also to the non-Tiirkmen commanders of the new corps. His appeal to the old discipline of the order (suflgari), to which reference has been made above, and the loyalty due to the shah as grand master of the order (shahlsavanl) may well have reflected similar considerations.
Nevertheless, during his reign of over forty years, the shah adhered consistently to the principle of centralisation for his state. Evidence for this is to be found not only in the reorganisation of the armed forces, with the creation of a standing army, the quashing of particularist tendencies on the part of the Qizilbash amirs and the abolition of practically independent tribal rulerships such as those just mentioned, the Dulghadir in Fars or those of the Afshar in Kirman, but also the annexation of the former vassal states of Mazandaran (1005-6/1596-8), Gllan (1000/1592 Lahljan, 1003/1595 Rasht) and Lar (1010/1601-2) and the resubjection or firmer attachment of independent areas such as the Georgian regions of Kakhetia (1029-30/1620-1) and Meskhetia (1032-3/1623-4) and the province of Makran (1017/1608-9).
The idea of centralisation is particularly in evidence in the way in which crown lands {khassa or khalisa) were systematically increased. There had in fact been royal demesnes in the Safavid empire prior to this. But it was 'Abbas I who began the process of incorporating whole provinces, indeed major provinces, into the crown lands, a practice to which his successors adhered. The implications of this can be assessed if we remember that between 996/1588 and 1014/1606 the provinces of Qazvln, Kashan, Isfahan, Kirman (in part), Yazd, Qum, Mazandaran, Gllan, Astara and Gaskar were finally, or at any rate for some considerable period, converted into royal demesne lands, so that their total revenue was reserved for the use of the shah, i.e. could neither be paid into the state treasury nor used for purposes of enfeoffment.
At the end of the 10th/16th and the beginning of the 9nth/17th century, Shah 'Abbas had mastered the crisis which had shaken his country at the time of his accession, in respect both of external enemies and of disruptive forces at home. Iran now enjoyed the greatest territorial extent it ever reached under the Safavids. After security had been restored in the country, 'Abbas turned his attention to establishing an effective administration. In the development of transport routes, which he pursued with energy, particularly noteworthy is the network of caravansarais he created, many of which are still preserved today, either completely or in remarkable remains, and take their place among the characteristic monuments of Persia.
These and other measures invigorated trade and industry, so that the broad masses of the population also found that their standard of living was at first improved and ultimately reached a level never known up to that time. Whereas in other parts of the Islamic world around this period economic setbacks occurred, due to the recessions in Mediterranean trade and the extension of Atlantic trade, Persia - at any rate in this period - seems to have been spared these changes and the consequences of the decline of the Central Asian caravan routes, from which it was in any case largely cut off by its Uzbek neighbours.