Metaphysical Understanding of God in Avicenna: Necessary Existence

  November 02, 2021   Read time 4 min
Metaphysical Understanding of God in Avicenna: Necessary Existence
Avicenna is a pioneering philosophical thinker in Islamic world. His coined terms revolutionized the field and offered a new paradigm that cleared a room for a monotheistic worldview and cosmological outlook. Here you can see his analysis of the God in metaphysical terms.

The being of bodies, accidents, and, in brief, the categories (maqūlāt) of this sensible world is clear. For all of these, quiddity (māhiyyat) is other than existence (anniyyat), which applies to all ten categories, and we have said [see Ilāhiyyāt §11 and §18] that these are all contingent beings (mumkin al-wujūd). Accidents subsist in bodies, and bodies are receptive to change, and bodies are composed of matter and form, and the two [together] are body. Matter does not subsist by an act of its own self (bi-nafs-i khwīsh). Form, likewise, does not do so. We have also said [see Ilāhiyyāt §20] that everything which exists in such a manner is a contingent being, and we have said that a contingent being is existent because of a cause. Its being is not from itself (bi-khud) and its being is from another thing, and this [contingent thing] is a transitory thing. [Moreover,] we have said that causes ultimately return to Necessary Existence, and Necessary Existence is unity (yakī būd).

Thus, it is evident that there is a First (awwal) to the world which does not reside in the world, and the being of the world is from It, and Its existence is necessary, and Its existence is from Itself (bi-khud). Moreover, it is, in its true reality (ḥaqīqat), Absolute Being. All things are in existence from It in the way that the light of the sun is from itself, and the light which comes from anything [else] is an accident from [the sun]. This analogy would be just if the sun were the source (nafs) of its light and subsisted in itself. However, it is not so, for the light of the sun is a created thing, and the being of Necessary Existence is not a created thing, for, moreover, It subsists through Itself.

It will be evident later [Ilāhiyyāt §32 , infra] that the cause by which the object of [knowledge] becomes known is that the form and the true reality (ḥaqīqat) of it are separated from matter. In the very same way, the cause of the existence of a thing’s knowledge is that its being is not in matter. Whenever the being, [when] disjoined from matter, is form, knowledge of that being is in the [other] being [which is] disjoined from matter. For example, whenever the form of humanity is disjoined from the matter of humanity, then there is knowledge of it [the form of humanity] in the soul (nafs). Since the form of the soul is itself disjoined from the matter in which it is [embodied], thus the soul itself is knowing itself through the soul itself, because it is that which is separated from matter, as we will make clear in its proper place [Ilāhiyyāt §31 , infra]. [This] knowledge proceeds from that which is not separated from it and also from that which arrives to it. Because it is disjoined [from matter], it is known from itself, from that which is not separated from it, and it is not separated from itself (khud az khud judā nīst). Hence, its knowing proceeds from itself and is known to itself.

Necessary Existence is disjoined from matter by an absolute disjunction. Its essence (dhāt) is not veiled to [or, disjoined from] Itself, and is not separated [from Itself]. Hence, Its knowledge proceeds from Itself and is known to Itself, and, moreover, It is knowledge (ʿilm ast). The disjoined [from matter], because it is disjoined, is such that its essence is knowledge of everything with which it is united (bi-harchi paywandad). Because it is a disjoined [thing, from matter], and because it is not separated from itself, its knowing proceeds from itself and it is known [to itself]. In true reality, what is known is knowledge, because that which is known to you is, in true reality, the form which is within you, not that thing of which it is the form. The thing [as it is] known is another being and is not the true reality (ḥaqīqat) itself [as it exists outside of knowledge]. The sensible is the effect which resides in sense, not that external thing, and that effect is the sensation [see Ṭabīʿiyyāt §47 ]. Hence, in true reality, the known is identical with knowledge. When the known is the knowledge of the soul (ʿilm al-nafs), then in that case knower and known and knowledge are one thing.


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