Of a thing which is contingent, for which it is possible (mumkin) that it exists and possible that it does not exist, it is not possible to know if it exists or does not exist. However, one can know that it is contingent, for contingency is necessary for the contingent, and existence and nonexistence are not necessary for a contingent [thing]. Since contingency is necessary, it is possible that it becomes known, and, because existence and nonexistence are not necessary, it is possible that it does not become known, for if it is known that it exists and that it is possible that it does not exist, [then] when it does not exist the knowledge is false, and falsity is not knowledge but is opinion (gumān). But it does not exist in the manner that it cannot be that it does not exist, and afterwards it is possible that it exists and it is possible that it does not exist.
However, for everything which is contingent in itself (binafs-i khwīsh), it is necessary that its existence or nonexistence is due to a cause. Hence, when one knows it from its cause, one knows it under the aspect of necessity. Thus, there can be knowledge of the contingent under the aspect in which it is necessary. For example, if someone says, ‘a particular individual will find a treasure tomorrow’, [that someone] does not have the power to know if [that individual] will find [the treasure] or will not find it, for this is contingent in itself. However, when one knows that a cause has inscribed in the heart of that particular individual [the cause] to set out [on a trip], and that a cause set him on a specific path, and that a cause makes him place his foot in a specific place, and it is known to be that the weight of his trampling is stronger than the cover [of the treasure], then in this case there is certitude that he will find the treasure. Thus, when this contingent is examined under its necessary aspect, it becomes known, and it is known that there has never been a thing which is not necessary.
Hence, there is a cause for everything, but the causes of things are not known to us completely (bi-tamāmī). Therefore, their necessity is not known to us. If we know some causes, it is opinion which prevails, and it is not certitude, because we know that all of the causes which we know do not make necessary the exis tence of [the contingent], for it is possible that there is another [intervening] cause or it is possible that an obstacle exists. If this [other cause or an obstacle] might exist or might not exist, this [i.e., the insufficiency of the known causes to provide certainty] is known to us with certainty.
Everything which exists returns to Necessary Existence, for it is necessary that they come from It. Therefore, all things are necessary in their relation to It, because they come to be necessary by Necessary Existence. Thus, all things are known by It.
French Contribution to World Cuisine: Culinarity and Dish Beauty
