Earlier in the year the Persians in Ghilan [Gilan] province north of Resht had been organized under Kuchik Khan, a Persian political leader. These Persians, known as Jangalees [Jangalis], or Jungle tribes from the nature of their country, were induced by German and other enemy agents to attack the British. This they did. The plan was apparently that they should take Resht and thus cut the line of communication to the Caspian, by which time the Turks in Azerbaijan would come across to join them and thus cut the British off from the Caspian. Kuchik Khan was supplied with considerable money and equipment by the Germans and Turks and attacked the British several times. He was apparently acting independently of the Persian government and was actuated by the money paid him as much as by any other cause. He attacked the British at Resht on July 20, 1918, and was badly defeated.
He was aided in this attack by several German and Austrian officers and soldiers who had escaped from Russia. His defeat at Resht and the failure of the Turks to get across to join him evidently discouraged him a great deal and, according to report, the British having offered a satisfactory price in gold for his goodwill, he made his peace with them during the second week in August, one of the peace conditions being, as I was told, that he would deliver up his German and Austrian assistants as prisoners to the British. The only other local or Persian opposition to the British occupation of the Bagdad-Caspian line was from the Sinjabis [Sanjabis], a Kurdish tribe on the Mesopotamian-Persian frontier. These people are reported to have been aroused by the German agent von Dreuffel, who is supposed later to have been drowned when attempting to cross a high river during the spring floods.
In their occupation of the Bagdad-Caspian line of communication the British appear to have treated the Persians living in that zone with reasonable consideration, feeding famine sufferers, giving employment in way of road building, etc., cleaning up the towns along the line both in the way of sanitation and of government, and in general doing the best they could to better the lot of the unfortunate Persian peasants who suffered so much from the Russians and the Turks. They have arrested some of the Persian officials who were considered dangerous or antagonistic because of the German propaganda to which they had been exposed, and have interfered in local Persian affairs in an apparently somewhat arbitrary manner which could not but cause ill-feeling among the Persian officials in Teheran. They have perhaps unnecessarily overlooked the sensitive feelings of the Persians in a few instances and have aroused considerable ill-will which might have been avoided by other methods. The giving of English names to the streets of the towns which they occupied seems to have been particularly offensive to Persian officials.
It seems reasonably certain that the British can and will hold the BagdadCaspian line of communication pending the outcome of the war, and it seems necessary, particularly to British interests, that they do so. While the Persians are quite unlikely to declare for the other side in the war, the presence of British forces in this part of Persia will check any probable advance of the enemy further into Persia, and will incidentally protect India, the British position in the Persian Gulf, and the important British-owned oil-fields in south-western Persia.
From all the information which I was able to obtain in Teheran it does not appear that the Persians committed any definitely hostile act against any one of three powers named, but have had to submit to several military invasions, principally on the ground of so-called military necessity, and to have parts of their country used as battlefields by the military forces of Russia, Turkey, and Great Britain. By Persians I mean the Persian government. Although not a belligerent Persia has suffered many damages and many of the disadvantages of a belligerent on the losing side in the world war. It is upon these grounds that the Persian government feels that Persia’s position is a special one, and that as it occupies a position entirely distinct or different from that of any other neutral country it has a right to a place at the principal peace conference to occur at the close of the war; and many prominent Persian officials expressed to me the hope that the United States would support them in this claim for a place at the main peace conference. I was emphatically informed by members of the Persian government at Teheran that they considered all of these military invasions as violations of Persian neutrality, and that in no case had the Persian government been consulted or had it consented to the occupation or invasions. The fight which occurred in Persian territory has resulted in a considerable loss of Persian life and property, and the Persians consider that they should have a place at the Peace Conference in order to ask for and to secure reparations for these injuries resulting from the many violations of Persian neutrality.
Southard’s Reports on British Invasions and the Occupation of Persia
