It was scarcely surprising that the most intensive discussions at San Francisco eoncerned the system of security proposed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The unique prerogatives which the great powers had reserved for themselves in this were scarcely calculated to endear themselves to the lesser states deprived of those privileges, but in fact were generally meekly accepted by them. But what particularly aroused concern was the point that had been raised by the United States and Britain at Dumbarton Oaks and had supposedly been resolved at Yalta: the danger that the permanent members might be in a position to prevent the organisation from operating in any dispute concerning themselves. These were precisely those situations which, in the eyes of others, were most likely to represent serious threats to the peace in the future. At Yalta, as we have seen, the Big Three had secured agreement on a formula which at least limited the use of the veto by great powers in their own defence. The formula provided that procedural questions, including the decision to place a matter on the agenda, could be reached by a vote of seven members of the Council, with no veto. The veto would normally apply to subsequent decisions of the Council. But a permanent member who was a party to a dispute could not vote to veto any decision to institute peaceful settlement procedures, including decisions concerning regional arrangements, relating to that dispute. The effect of that formula seemed to be that the veto could not be used to prevent any question involving a permanent member from being discussed by the Council, but it might be used to prevent enforcement action from being taken against such a member.
Disputed Points of UN Charter: Further Elaborations and Discussions
