Similarly, many tribal leaders and other vested interests opposed military reforms, fearing that a stronger standing army would limit their autonomy. Army offi cers and others who profited from the corruption of the existing system also opposed modernization. Finally, despite the obvious importance of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf to Iran’s security and commerce, the Qajars refused to spend enough to develop a naval force. Within a few years following Nader Shah’s death, his fl eet ceased to exist. The Qajars did not start to think about creating a small naval establishment until 1850, years aft er it became clear that British naval power in the Gulf posed a threat to Iranian security. Nasir al- Din Shah (r. 1848–96), however, had to turn to his potential British foes in an eff ort to acquire two sloops- of- war of twenty- fi ve guns each. The British declined to sell the warships, in part out of concern that Iran had designs on Bahrain, which would upset relations with Great Britain’s Arab allies in the Gulf. Nasir al- Din approached the British again in 1868 about acquiring a steam fl otilla for the Persian Gulf to be commanded by British naval offi cers. These were intended for use in ongoing disputes with Oman, but the shah soon lost interest and indicated that Iran wanted the British to continue to police the region’s waters.
Crown Prince Abbas Mirza, the son of Fath Ali and the governor of Azerbaijan, was the fi rst signifi cant proponent of Qajar military reforms. With his eye on his eventual accession to the throne, Abbas Mirza may have wanted an army that owed its existence and loyalty to him and that depended on the crown for arms and pay. Faced with an ongoing confl ict with an expansionist Russia, Abbas Mirza was a fi rm believer that Iran needed an army with more modern arms drilled along European lines. His resolution was reinforced by his knowledge of European military exploits, including the British victories in India and the French defeat of the Egyptian Mamluks in 1798. Abbas Mirza reasoned that if the Mamluks, with their renowned military prowess, were so easily defeated by Napoleon, then Iranian troops would suff er a similar fate if a European power invaded. According to a diplomatic envoy, Abbas Mirza lamented that it was in vain to fi ght the Russians without soldiers like theirs and without artillery. The crown prince even forced Russian prisoners of war to train his troops in European techniques and later created a Russian batt alion formed of Russian deserters and Armenian and Nestorian Christians. The Russian batt alion, which grew to 1,400 men in 1829, declined over time to a force of about 500 that formed a palace guard during the reigns of Fath Ali Shah and Muhammad Shah before being disbanded in 1839.
Although preceded by the British Malcolm mission of 1801, the French Gardanne mission of 1807 provided the fi rst systematic training for Qajar troops by European offi cers. Aft er arriving in Tabriz, the French began drilling Abbas Mirza’s batt alions and erecting modern fortifi cations. Some of the French offi cers draft ed maps and translated treatises on military tactics and theories of fortifi - cation. They also helped to establish a cannon foundry and arsenal at Esfahan. The British returned with thirty military instructors and engineers as part of the small Brydges mission in 1808, which, working from the unratifi ed treaty signed by Malcolm to provide military equipment and training, drilled Abbas Mirza’s troops and held classes on surveying, mapping, and geography. The Brydges mission also delivered twenty pieces of artillery and forty wagons of cartridges to Iran. In 1829 an Iranian mission was sent to Austria to obtain information on the latest methods of warfare. More military instruction was provided by the British in 1836 and the French in 1839.
After the French were replaced by the British in 1808, Abbas Mirza assembled a force of twelve thousand infantrymen in twelve batt alions of one thousand men each, twelve thousand cavalrymen, and an artillery force armed with the twenty British guns. The infantry and cavalry were given uniforms with vaguely French- style jackets to go with their traditional sheepskin hats and baggy trousers. The British mission had the artillerymen clothed in British style, but as good Muslims the Iranians ignored instructions for the gunners to be clean- shaven. When the crown prince witnessed an accident in which a soldier’s beard was ignited by a spark from a gun, however, he saw the policy’s wisdom and ordered his soldiers to shave. Abbas Mirza created a translation offi ce for military and engineering manuals, and he established factories for cannon and muskets, but shortages of skilled manpower and equipment limited production. At Tehran, Fath Ali had his own army with regular infantry, cavalry, and horse artillery, but it was a token force that was less well trained and disciplined than the crown prince’s army and was always below strength.
Deplorable Military Status of Persia under Qajars
