In the years after his repulse of the Ilig Nasr's invasion of Khurasan, Mahmud exploited the internal rivalries of the Qarakhanids by allying first with Ahmad Toghan Khan (d. 408/1017-18) of Semirechye and, till the last years of his life, of Kashghar also, and then with Yusuf Qadi'r Khan of Khotan and Kashghar. This last alliance was specifically aimed at the ruler of Bukhara and Samarqand, 'All b. Harun Bughra Khan, called 'Ali-Tegin. 'All-Tegin had captured Bukhara in 411/1020, and down to his death fourteen years later, was the most skilful and persistent opponent of Ghaznavid ambitions in Central Asia. In 416/1025 Mahmud invaded Transoxiana with the aim of overthrowing c Ali-Tegin.
The sultan met with Yusuf Qadi'r Khan at Samarqand; according to the Ghaznavid historian Gardizi's account, presents were exchanged on a munificent scale by the two sovereigns, and complex negotiations for a marriage alliance begun. The sultan and the khan joined forces, firstly to scatter Ali-Tegin's allies the Saljuq Turks, and then to drive 'Ali-Tegin himself into the steppes. However, Mahmud now withdrew from Transoxiana in order to prepare for the Somnath expedition. 'Ali-Tegin re-emerged and took back his former possessions. Hence Barthold was probably right in surmising that Mahmud preferred to leave cAli-Tegin in Transoxiana as a counterpoise to the power of Yusuf Qadir Khan.
West of Khurasan stretched the territories of various Dailaml powers, above all, of the Buyids. With the Ziyarids of Gurgan and Tabaristan (who were actually orthodox Sunnis in faith), Mahmud had friendly relations, and after the death in 402/1011-12 of Qabus b. Vushmgir, this dynasty was virtually tributary to the Ghaznavids. At first, Mahmud supported the claims to the succession of Dara b. Qabus, who had been a refugee in Ghazna during his father's lifetime; but he soon came to recognize Manuchihr b. Qabus as amir, after the latter had been raised to the throne by local interests. The new Ziyarid amir became Mahmud's son-in-law, and on various occasions, sent troop contingents to the Ghaznavid army. In this way, the sultan maintained a friendly power at the western approaches of Khurasan, and thereby deterred the Buyids from making moves in that direction.
Although it no longer had the cohesion and might which it had had in the days of Adud al-Daula, the Buyid empire was still territorially impressive, embracing as it did most of Iraq and western and central Persia. But structurally it was weak, in that by the early 5th/nth century, it lacked a single, generally acknowledged head, and this want of a united front weakened Buyid abilities to resist first the Ghaznavids and then the Saljuqs. It would not have been difficult for the sultan to find a plausible pretext for meddling in Buyid affairs: first, the Buyids were Shia, and as long as they held Baghdad, the 'Abbasid caliph could not be considered a free agent; and secondly, the inability of the later Buyids to keep internal order meant that pilgrims travelling from the east to the Holy Places were constantly harried and financially mulcted whilst crossing the Buyid lands. According to Ibn al-Jauzi, Mahmud was specifically reproached in 412/1021 for his lack of interest in the tribulations of these pilgrims, and was unfavourably compared with the Kurdish ruler of Hamadan, Nihavand and Dinavar, Badr b. Hasanuya, who always gave subsidies and aid to the pilgrim caravans passing through his lands
Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud and His Achievements
