The following account of that convention is based on a memorandum written by Augustin W. Ferrin, the American vice consul in Tehran in the second half of the 1920s. By this agreement, Britain promised to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia and to supply expert advisers, at Persian expense, for the reform of the administration, to provide munitions and equipment for the creation of a modern Persian army, to arrange a loan for the Persian government to carry out these reforms, and, in the meantime, to advance some funds while withholding oil revenues.
Britain expressed its readiness to cooperate with the Persian government to encourage Anglo-Persian enterprise in railways and other forms of transport. The two governments agreed to the appointment of a joint commission for the revision of the existing customs tariff. On the same day, the British signed a supplemental agreement to loan Persia £2 million at 7 percent interest secured upon the southern customs, subject to service of a previous loan of £1.25 million made in May 1911. The loan was to be paid in installments after the arrival of a British financial adviser in Tehran. The agreement was signed by Sir Percy Cox for the British. The Persian signatories were the prime minister, Hassan Vossough-ed-Dowleh; the foreign minister, Prince Firouz Mirza Nosrat-ed-Dowleh; and the minister of finance, Prince Akbar Mirza Massoud Sarem-ed-Dowleh.
The agreement was deeply distrusted by the public, who suspected secret clauses. The suspicions were strengthened when it became known that the three Persian signatories had received £131,000 immediately after signing. In the words of Ferrin, “later the British claimed that this was an advance to the Persian government under the loan agreement of August 9, 1919, but no evidence appears ever to have been adduced to show that the money ever reached the treasury, or indeed to explain what did become of it.” Deeply suspicious of the affair, Caldwell describes in vivid terms the attempt to force the agreement on the Persian people through bribery, coercion, and intimidation: The outstanding and unique feature of the whole affair is not the treaty itself but the dexterity and celerity with which it was put over the public who were made to accept it and not allowed to even privately voice a dissenting opinion, under fear of imprisonment or deportation, though an adroit and systematic attempt was made to prepare the fallow ground of public opinion in advance, during the several months this treaty was being formulated.
The reason that the particular members of the Persian Peace Commission to Paris were chosen was that it was thought best to have them out of the country at this critical time, knowing that their hands would be tied in Paris. Others of like integrity, ability and patriotism have been sent away on pretext of pilgrimage or appointment to consular posts. More remarkable, even, than this allaying and silencing of criticism was the method of openly buying and corrupting the venal priesthood, all too many of whom are known to have been given and to have accepted presents, money, pensions and other tokens.
It is but fair to say, however, that a great number of the priesthood, as well as the public, could not be so reached, and the only method to silence these was through threats, fear of imprisonment, etc. Then again, a great amount of fawning and entertaining was done, of which even some of our Americans were the recipients. Favors and flattery were expended on many of these people who were of too little importance to ever have been hitherto noticed, though this procedure and unusual attention were too apparent to escape the notice of any observant person. While the war was pending it was usually sufficient, in order to stifle criticism, to loudly proclaim that any critic or objector was pro-German, but such a false weapon cannot now be employed and resort to subtler means becomes necessary.
The Vossough government silenced the opposition with imprisonment and exile and imposed strict press censorship. It appears that what transpired under Vossough’s government was a minor and mild version of events under Reza Khan. Caldwell writes: cowardice and timidity of the Oriental, makes it extremely unlikely that any effective measure can be taken to stop its enforcement. This is especially true in view of the presence of several thousand British soldiers in Persia, the absence of the Shah in Europe and the all too willingness of the present Cabinet to faithfully serve the power that made and maintains it.
The Consolidation of Power by Vossough
