Wiktorowicz describes a useful typology consisting of three categories of Salafist. Although more recent typologies have also refined it, it remains useful for our purpose: The different contextual readings have produced three major factions in the community: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis. The purists emphasize a focus on non-violent methods of propagation, purification, and education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, in contrast, emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution. All three factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose different solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief.
Wiktorowicz presents a relevant analysis of the Salafists by dividing them into three factions. The terminology that he presents, that is, purists, politicos and jihadis, will be used throughout the book to differentiate between the factions of the Salafists, although quietists will also be used for purists. This typology has its limitations, for instance by excluding the quietists’ recourse to violence, but it does have the merit of providing a working model that retains presentday relevance. The quietists are the most numerous among the Salafists. Typically, they scrupulously abide by the edicts of the official clerics in Saudi Arabia and follow their recommendations to the letter. They emphasise the impermissibility of suicide bombings and terrorism by relaying the fatwas of their scholars upon these issues. The religious figures whom the quietists recognise are the Saudis Ibn Baz (d.1999) and Ibn ‘Uthaymin (d.2000), and the Syrian al-Albani (d.1999). The quietists are subdivided into other categories as the result of internal politics but, on the whole, they form a coherent group.
The second category that Wiktorowicz has identified is the politicos who are engaged in reforming society and debating current political problems both in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world. They, too, recognise the three personalities quoted above, alongside the two reformists Safar al-Hawali (b.1950) and Salman al-‘Awda (b.1955) from the Sahwa movement which advocates a ‘revival’ of Muslim society. Contemporary figures like Dr Haitham al-Haddad, founder of islam21c.com, who focus upon current affairs, might also be in this category. Al-Hawali and al-‘Awda were imprisoned for several years by the Saudi government because of their political activism, but after their release and the apparent rejection of their former positions, they have gradually been reintegrated into official positions. These two leaders are personally active on the internet (al-‘Awda, for example, has more than 12 million followers on Twitter) and are arguably more engaged with young people and current affairs than other established Saudi clerics.
The third category of Salafists are those that Wiktorowicz has named the jihadis. Their interpretation of the current situation is that there is sufficient justification for violent confrontation with the West and its allies. This category may be further divided into other sub-groups based upon the extent to which cooperation with non-Muslim authorities is permitted. Their sources of inspiration are Osama bin Laden and other leaders of al-Qa‘ida and affiliated groups. Nowadays they are mostly represented by the leaders of ‘IS’. This group is at the centre of many recent studies and scholarly works. The three factions of Salafists share the same theological background and this is why shared sources will be referenced in the next chapters, in order to study their understanding of the belief in God and His Attributes.
Islam and Nonviolence Policy: Gandhi and Pacifist Muslims
