Negotiations between the two countries began soon afterwards; but they soon proved inconclusive. On 18 February the Iranian Prime Minister flew to Moscow and -asked for a quick evacuation and an end to interference. The Soviet Government, it was reported, asked for recognition of the autonomy of Azerbaijan, for a discussion of oil concessions for the Soviet Union in Iran and even for an agreement to station Soviet troops in northern Iran for an indefinite period. But it did give renewed assurances of its intention to evacuate all its forces by 2 March, six months after the end of the war.
None the less, when 2 March came and went, Soviet forces remained. On 18 March the Iranian ambassador therefore addressed a further note to the president of the Council. He accused the Soviet Union of retaining troops in Iran after the date due for withdrawal, and for continuing to interfere in Iran's affairs. The Soviet delegate rejected these charges. He said that negotiations were continuing and asked that consideration of the item be deferred until 10 April.
When the Council none the less met on 26 March, the Soviet delegate declared that there was nothing to discuss. Evacuation of Soviet forces generally had begun on 2 March; withdrawal of those stationed in Azerbaijan had started on 24 March, two days earlier, and would be completed in five or six weeks. At the following meeting the Soviet delegate therefore again proposed postponement until 1 0 April. When this was defeated, the Soviet delegate declared that he could not participate in the discussion and left the chamber.
Everything therefore hinged on what the Russians were really doing and what concessions they were demanding in return. On 29 March it was agreed in the Council that the Secretary-General should discover from the two parties the existing state of negotiations and whether, as the Iranian delegate had reported, the withdrawal of Soviet troops was being made conditional on agreement on other questions. In reply to these enquiries the Soviet delegate declared that a firm agreement had already been reached between the two governments and that withdrawal would be completed early in May. Other matters, such as the Soviet proposal for an oil concession or ajoint stock company, had been raised entirely independently and had in fact been under discussion since 1944. They were thus not intended as preconditions for withdrawal. The Iranian ambassador quoted earlier conversations in Tehran in which the Soviet ambassador had raised the question of autonomy for Azerbaijan and the formation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil corporation at the same time as discussions about withdrawal. But he confirmed that the Soviet ambassador there had now confirmed the promise to evaucate Iran 'provided no unforeseen circumstances occur'. At the following Council meeting, on 4 April, the US Government proposed, and the Council accepted, a resolution that, in the light of the Soviet Government's declared intention of withdrawing its forces in five or six weeks, discussion should be deferred until 6 May, when the Council would consider what, 'if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal was required'. So some form of external pressure was maintained.
The same day a general understanding was reached between the Soviet and Iranian governments; and two days later the Soviet representatives requested that the item should be removed altogether from the Council's agenda. This request was at first resisted by the Iranian ambassador. A week or so later, however, on 15 April, the Iranian Government formally requested that her complaint should be withdrawn from the Council, saying they had complete confidence in the pledges of the Soviet Government.
There followed a long and complicated legal wrangle concerning whether a complaint, once considered by the Council, could be simply withdrawn at the request of the original complainant. This seemed the common-sense conclusion. The item had been inscribed originally as a 'dispute' under Article 35, and it was arguable that, ifboth parties held the dispute to be at an end, the Council had no more to do with the matter. On the other hand, it was held by Western delegates that, so long as any threat to the peace persisted, it was a legitimate subject for the Council's attention. The matter was discussed in a long memorandum put forward by the Secretary-General (drafted by his legal counsel). In somewhat ambiguous language he found that, in the case of a 'dispute' that had been resolved, the Security Council might have no grounds for continuing to consider the matter once the complaint had been withdrawn: in these circumstances 'it might well be that there was no way in which it could remain seized of the matter'. A committee of experts was established by the Council to consider the question. But this consisted only of the legal advisers of each Council member, and it divided, not surprisingly, in exactly the same way as the Council itself: eight for retention of the item and three (the Soviet Union, Poland and France) for deletion. A French resolution which in effect withdrew the matter from the agenda was lost; and in these circumstances the Soviet delegate again announced his intention to withdraw from all further discussion of the matter.
United for Egalitarianism
