The merchants were joined by leading clerics, local revolutionary councils and fighters, and other discontented elements of Iranian society. Popular protests eventually forced the shah to promise to surrender his absolute power and convene representatives of the people in a “house of justice.” Muzzafar al- Din refused to keep his promise, and in mid- 1906, the government exiled nationalist leaders, inciting greater unrest. When a leading cleric in Tehran was arrested, a group of theology students tried to free the mullah. They challenged Cossack Brigade soldiers sent to impose a curfew, and one student was killed in the ensuing melee. The movement now had a martyr, and the young man’s bloody shirt was quickly raised by his fellow students and carried through the streets of Tehran.
Fighting men soon emerged from this turmoil who were as hardy as Iran’s regular soldiers but more eff ective, despite insuffi cient supplies, training, and modern arms. All were volunteers—workers, poor city dwellers, peasants, and tribesmen with a smatt ering of young reformers and intellectuals. The irregular fi ghters were initially part of local protective forces created by nationalist political movements. As the fi ght for a constitution was fully joined, most became insurrectionists and guerrillas and were joined by disaff ected tribes. Some of the most noteworthy were the mujahedin and fedayeen (“self- sacrifi cers for the holy cause”) from northwestern Iran, the guerrilla fi ghters of Gilan and Khorasan, and the Bakhtiari tribe. In Tabriz, a volunteer army of several thousand men of all ages was formed by a revolutionary anjuman, an old Persian name meaning “council” or “gathering.” The mujahedin’s initial engagements in Tabriz were with criminal elements hired by the Qajar elite to att ack the dissidents. They soon created the Secret Center (Markaz- e Ghaibi), the primary operational command for the mujahedin, to counter Qajar att acks with a program of assassinations and intimidation. Over time, the revolutionaries added explosives and bombs to their arsenals and carried out acts of sabotage against the movement’s enemies.
The quantity and quality of the irregulars and their arms varied widely throughout Iran. German Mauser rifl es and handguns can be seen in photographs of the Tabriz mujahedin, and British and Russian fi rearms were available to these and other revolutionary forces. Meanwhile, similar formations were developed in other regions as anjumans were created in Tehran, Gilan, Khorasan, and Esfahan provinces. The peasants in Gilan, who joined the volunteer forces and became active defenders of the nationalist movement, gained a reputation as superior guerrilla fi ghters. In one encounter with the Gilan guerrillas, an army report noted, “We saw no one, but a hundred bullets rained on us.” The Bakhtiari and other tribesmen who fought with the mujahedin, meanwhile, numbered several thousand and had the same qualities and skills as shown by the tribal levies used by the Qajar armed force. Although they are unlikely to have greatly enhanced the irregulars’ capabilities, some former Qajar soldiers joined with the mujahedin.
The Qajars paid for their neglect of the army during the crisis. At the height of the protests, the commander of several of the regular army regiments garrisoned in Tehran announced that his troops would not fi ght against the people. In other cities Qajar soldiers either refused to fi re on the protestors or joined them. In a lett er to the Shah titled “The Patriot’s Cry from the Heart,” a leading senior cleric in the Constitutionalist movement appealed on behalf of Iranian soldiers, writing that the sarbaz “is deprived of his meager rations and wages and mostly earns his sustenance by coolie labor.” He claimed that many soldiers perished from hunger every day, stating, “No worse defect than this can be imagined for a kingdom.” Only aft er the government increased and distributed their pay were soldiers in Tehran willing to perform some duties, such as clearing streets and forcing shops to open.
Even the Cossack Brigade, despite its royalist leanings, was mostly passive. In any event, its capacity to intervene had been weakened by its fi nancial problems. In addition, the unit’s 1,500 Iranian enlisted men were sympathetic to the popular demands for a national assembly and a constitution, especially aft er mullahs joined the protests. When the new commandant, a Colonel Liakhov, arrived in September 1906, he found that the brigade was out of the Russian offi cers’ control and was being run by a council of Iranian offi cers. Liakhov succeeded in abolishing the council and weeding out anti- Russian offi cers. He then gained the confi dence of his men by defending their interests, briefl y improving the unit’s discipline and effi ciency. Nonetheless, popular resentment of the brigade caused the Russians to keep a lower profile.
United People against the Despot: Dominos of Uprisings and Frustrated Shah
