Practically all scholars who have investigated the shah’s career divide it into two distinct phases: an early phase covering the period up to roughly 1962, in which he was generally perceived to be beleaguered by subversive forces at home, and a later strong phase, in which he gained control of Iran internally and pursued his forward policy of turning the Gulf into an Iranian lake. Under this interpretation, the forces that plagued the shah throughout his early years of rule gave way later on; this particularly was the case with his most formidable opponents, the Communists.
Scholars, in attempting to account for this turnabout, have focused on the so-called White Revolution, an ambitious reform program undertaken by the shah to transform Iranian society from the top down. This program, in which estates were parceled out to the peasants, and in which other lesser but still critical reforms were enacted, is generally credited with broadening the base of the shah’s regime and enabling him to consolidate his position.
As to what motivated the shah to launch his reforms, it is generally understood that he was forced to do so under pressure from Washington. The theory goes that the Americans, unhappy with the appalling corruption of the Iranian system, held back aid from the shah. This goaded him to confront the corruption problem head-on, which he did by launching the White Revolution.
While there are certainly elements of truth in this interpretation, it does not fully explain the transformation of the shah’s power position. Something much more fundamental occurred in the early 1960s that affected his career: He and the Soviet Union achieved rapprochement. Whereas in the 1950s, in the time of Stalin, Moscow had assiduously tried to topple the shah—for this its principal instrument had been the Tudeh (Iranian Communist) Party—with the advent of Khrushchev, it eased pressure against him.
This change in Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union was a concomitant of the era of détente, when the Soviets saw it to be in their interest to work with established governments of the Middle East, even governments like that of Iran. As a consequence the Soviets at this time began cutting back their support for various dissident groups, including the local Communist parties. This change affected both Iran and Iraq. In the case of Iraq, Moscow continued to develop good relations with Baghdad into the late 1970s, when the Ba’thists purged the Iraqi Communist Party, executing twenty-one of its leaders and driving the senior cadre into exile, from which they have yet to return.
To be sure, the shah had to make accommodations to the Soviets to neutralize their enmity for him. In 1962, for example, he agreed that no foreign missile bases would be established in Iranian territory. This, however, was not a significant concession; the United States did not need to base its short-range missiles in Iran after the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1965, the Soviet Union contracted to assist in the construction of a major metallurgical complex near Ispahan, paid for with gas from the Iranian oil fields. And, perhaps of most significance, Iran in 1966 contracted to purchase $100 million in small arms from the Soviets.
But the bottom line is that once freed from obsessive concern about the threat of Soviet subversion, the shah could attack other entrenched and hostile centers of power inside his country, such as the wealthy landlords and the clergy. This in fact was what the White Revolution was all about. From a political standpoint, it was a vehicle for undercutting the power of the landowning interests, including the clergy, who controlled vast tracts of land through religious foundations. At the same time, however, while it was vitally important that the shah centralize his authority, by itself the move was insufficient to secure his rule. Eliminating opposition was, after all, a negative activity. The shah also needed to strengthen his rule positively. He needed to overcome the major weakness of his regime: the fact that there were no strong institutions in Iran on which he could rely to perpetuate the monarchical form of government.
The Shah's Persia vs. Saddam Hussain's Iraq: US-USSR Revelry in Middle East
